

seaward. The natural reefs which form the sea-wall afford the greatest facilities for batteries *à fleur-d'eau*, as their solid foundations require the simple levelling of cement, and a facing of steel plates would complete an impregnable line of casemates that would render the approach by sea impossible.

The advantages of attendant colliers is great as a continuous coal-supply to a fleet, especially during the blockade of an enemy's port; but for a cruising fleet, or for independent vessels, the speed of the colliers would be insufficient, and a line of coaling-stations at intervals of five days' steaming is in my opinion highly important, in addition to the necessity of docks where ironclad vessels could obtain the necessary repairs after a naval engagement. It is a serious result of modern improvements that the cumbrous and complicated ironclads cannot be repaired in a few days after an action with the enemy by their own carpenters and crews, like the wooden vessels of old, but that docks must be within reach, and all the appliances of the engineers' yards and an arsenal. Without this advantage, Famagousta would be a useless acquisition, and Cyprus would be worthless as a strategical position.

In my opinion the entire question hangs upon the integrity of Turkey as an ally. England has done but little for her, and we may expect too much. The Turks are thoroughly aware that an Anglo-Turkish defensive alliance, and the "Protectorate of Asia Minor by Great Britain," are political arrangements based upon self-interest, for which they owe us no personal gratitude; in the hour of their distress we declined material assistance, but seized the opportunity for occupying one of their important positions—Cyprus;